Kegworth Air Crash International CAA

Kegworth Air Crash- International Civil Aviation Organization regulations

May 28, 2025

Criteria 2

Discussion of how these International Civil Aviation Organization regulations could be further improved. Consideration and reference back to Parts 1 and 2 of report.

The official report into the disaster made some changes in safety regulations related to Kegworth Air Crash.. Evaluation of the injuries sustained led to considerable improvements in aircraft safety and emergency instructions for passengers. These were derived from a research programmed funded by the CAA and carried out by teams from the University of Nottingham and Hawtal Whiting Structures (an engineering consultancy company).

The research into this accident led to the formation of the International Board for Research into Aircraft Crash Events (IBRACE) on 21 November 2016. IBRACE is a joint cooperation between experts in the field for the purpose of producing an internationally agreed, evidence-based set of impact bracing positions for passengers and (eventually) cabin crew members in a variety of seating configurations. These will be submitted to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) through its Cabin Safety Group (ICSG). These regulations include.

CAA consider increasing the frequency of existing engine inspections and engine health monitoring on Boeing 737-300 and Boeing 737-400 aircraft until the causes of the engine failure(s) are
CAA call for an examination of the Boeing 737-300 and Boeing 737-4tltJ engine Fire/overheat and Vibration monitoring circuitry for left/right engine sense.
The Civil Aviation Authority, in conjunction with the engine manufacturer, consider instituting inspection procedures for the examination of the fan stage of CFM56 engines to ensure the early detection of damage that could lead to the failure of a case.

The Civil Aviation Authority review the advice given in the Boeing 737-400 Maintenance Manual concerning the excessive generation of heat during blending operations with power grinding and blending
The CAA should take action to advise pilots of Boeing 737-300/400 aircraft, and of other types with engines which have similar characteristics, that where instances of engine-induced high vibration occur, they may be accompanied by associated smoke and /or smells of burning entering the flight deck and/or cabin through the air- conditioning system, due merely to blade tip contact between fan/compressor rotating assemblies and the associated abradable

The CAA should review the current attitude of pilots to the engine vibration indicators on Boeing 737-300J400 aircraft, and other applicable types with turbofan engines, with a view towards providing flight crews with an indication of the pertinence of such vibration instruments when engine malfunctions or failures
The CAA should require that pilot training associated with aircraft which are equipped with modern vibration systems 6, and particularly those aircraft which are fitted with high by-pass turbofan engines, should include specific instruction on the potential value of engine vibration indicators in assisting the identification of an engine which has suffered a failure associated with its rotating
The regulatory requirements concerning the certification of new instrument presentations should be amended to include a standardized method of assessing the effectiveness of such displays in transmitting the associated information to flight crew, under normal and abnormal parameter conditions. In addition, line pilots should be used in such evaluations.

The CAA should require that the engine instrument system on the Boeing 737-400, and other applicable public transport aircraft, be modified to include an attention-getting facility to draw attention to each vibration indicator when it indicates maximum vibration. (Made 30 March 1990)
The CAA should request the Boeing Commercial Airplane Company to produce amendments to the existing aircraft Flight Manuals to indicate what actions should be taken when engine-induced high vibration occurs, accompanied by smoke and/or the smell of burning entering the flight deck and/or
The CAA should ensure that flight crew currency training in simulators includes practice reprogramming of flight management systems, or any other such systems which control key approach and landing display format, during unplanned diversions so that they remain practised in the expeditious use of such
The CAA should review the current guidance to air traffic controllers on the subject of offering a discrete RT frequency to the commander of a public transport aircraft in an emergency situation, with a view towards the merits of positively offering this important option.

The CAA should review current airline transport pilot training requirements to ensure that pilots, who lack experience of electronic flight displays, are provided with familiarisation of such displays in a flight simulator, before flying public transport aircraft that are so equipped.
Training exercises for pilots and cabin crew should be introduced to improve co- ordination between technical and cabin crews in response to an
The CAA should review current airline transport pilot training requirements with a view towards considering the need to restore the balance in flight crew technical appreciation of aircraft systems, including systems response under abnormal conditions, and to evaluate the potential of additional simulator training in flight deck decision

The type certification requirements for gas turbine engines should be amended so that it is mandatory to perform instrumented flight tests to demonstrate freedom from damaging vibratory stresses at all altitude conditions and powers which an engine will encounter in service.
The potential for fuel and oil system leakage within the fan case area of high by-pass turbofan engines, during conditions of excessive vibration, should be reviewed by the engine manufacturers and the CAA with a view towards modifying such systems to minimise such leakage, and the associated fire risk.
The CAA should review the existing Joint Airworthiness Requirements concerning fuel tank protection from the effects of main landing gear and engine detachment during ground impact and include specific design requirements to protect the fuel tank integrity of those designs of aircraft with wing-mounted engines.
The CAA should expedite current research into methods of providing flight deck crews of public transport aircraft with visual information on the status of their aircraft by means of external and internal closed circuit television monitoring and the recording/recall of such monitoring, including that associated with flight deck presentations, with a view towards producing a requirement for all UK public transport aircraft to be so equipped
The manufacturers of existing flight data recorders which use buffering techniques should give consideration to making the buffers non-volatile and hence recoverable after loss of power, and EUROCAE and the CAA should reconsider the concept of allowing volatile memory buffering in flight data recorders.
Where engine vibration is an available parameter for flight data recording, the CAA should consider making a requirement for it to be recorded at a sampling rate of once every second.
The CAA should actively seek further improvement in the standards of JAR 25.561/.562 and the level of such standards should not be constrained by the current FAA requirements.
The CAA should require that, for aircraft passenger seats, the current loading and dynamic testing requirements of JAR 25.561 and .562 be applied to newly manufactured aircraft coming onto the UK register and, with the minimum of delay, to aircraft already on the UK register.
In addition to the dynamic test requirements, the CAA should seek to modify the JARs associated with detailed seat design to ensure that such seats are safety-engineered to minimise occupant injury in an impact.
The CAA should initiate and expedite a structured programme of research, in conjunction with the European airworthiness authorities, into passenger seat design, with particular emphasis on: (i) Effective upper torso restraint. (ii) Aft-facing passenger seats.
The certification requirements for cabin floors of new aircraft types should be modified to require that dynamic impulse and distortion be taken into account and these criteria should be applied to future production of existing designs.
The CAA should initiate research, in conjunction with the European airworthiness authorities, into the feasibility of a significant increase in cabin floor toughness beyond the level of the current JAR/FAR seat requirements.
The CAA implement a programme to require that all infants and young children, who would not be safely restrained by supplementary or standard lap belts, be placed in child-seats for take-off, landing and flight in turbulence.
The CAA expedite the publication of a specification for child seat designs.
The certification requirements for cabin stowage bins, and other cabin items of mass, should be modified to ensure the retention of these items to fuselage structure when subjected to dynamic crash pulses substantially beyond the static load factors currently required.
The CAA consider improving the airworthiness requirements for public transport aircraft to require some form of improved latching to be fitted to overhead stowage bins and this should also apply to new stowage bins fitted to existing aircraft.

Criteria 3

Discussion of the litigation that resulted from the incident

There are few cases which were under high discussion related to Kegworth Air Crash

Crash 1- When the crash occurred, a retired Royal Marine was traveling nearby. Graham Pearson provided assistance to travelers for more than three hours. In 1998, he sued British Midland and was awarded £57,000 in costs (equivalent to £95,000 today).
A Northern Icelander Nurse and his son have been paid £245,000 in reimbursement for the Kegworth air accident, which occurred in January 1989 when a British Midland Boeing 737 crashed on the M1 in Leicestershire, killing 47 passengers.
In August 1991, the Post announced that Mr McClelland won almost £10,000 in an out-of-court payout from British Midland after alleging wrongful dismissal. According to a corporate spokesman, the deal was reached on solely legal terms and was not an acknowledgment that the airline behaved improperly in terminating the pilot’s employment.
Vic first approached ten years after the Kegworth Air Crash. He has been diagnosed with PTSD. Other solicitors told him that he was out of time. However, we pressed the allegation and obtained a settlement of £136,000. Vic came in April 1999. He was dealing with PTSD ten years after he was involved in the Kegworth plane accident. Vic was a British Midland Airways flight attendant on the M1 when the British Midland Airways plane crashed on January 8, 1989. As one of the first responders, he saw horrifying scenes and helped with the removal of the deceased and wounded. Vic later had distressing hallucinations, delusions, intense irritability, and inability to concentrate. This created considerable difficulties for him at home and at college. In 1998, he was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder, which was, crucially, due to the air disaster. Vic met with his union’s legal counsel. They told him that he would be unable to make a successful argument due to the passage of time. As Vic came to Barratts for a consultation, we recognised the challenges but believed Vic needed a chance to pursue a lawsuit. We crafted a compelling argument against British Midland Airways. They protested that it was too late to make a lawsuit, but admitted it on the eve of the Trial. Additionally, they decided to compensate Vic in the sum of £136,000